Kenya's parliamentary elections: ethnic politics in two rural constituencies in Nyanza by Alila, Patrick O.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
KENYA'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: 
ETHNIC POLITICS IN TWO RURAL 
CONSTITUENCIES IN NYANZA 
by 
Patrick 0. Alila 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 282 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
July, 1986 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They 
should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the 
Institute for Development Studies or of the University of 
Nairobi. 
This paper has protection under the Copyright Act, Cap. 130 
of the Laws of Kenya. 
IDS/DP 282 
KENYA'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: ETHNIC POLITICS 
IN TWO RURAL CONSTITUENCIES IN NYANZA 
ABSTRACT 
This analysis traces the historical origins of Luo ethnic 
factor and discusses the role it has played in modern electoral politics 
in two rural constituencies in Nyanza: Bondo and Gem. The ethnic factor 
is seen to emerge from social transformation starting from the pre-
colonial period and this took significantly different patterns in each 
of the two constituencies. 
The crux of the argument is that following the introduction 
of elections there has been a process of selective modernisation whereby 
both 'modern' and 'traditional' values have combined. The institution 
of elections is not therefore operating purely under the influence of 
values elections are associated with in western democracies especially 
the determining role of parties in electoral politics. 
The thrust of the analysis is therefore on the existence of 
social forces which have determined the somewhat surprising election 
results in the two constituencies. Furthermore, proper understanding 
of these social forces can help in the prediction, of outcomes of elec-
tions in these areas. 
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Introduction 
The term modernization has greatly influenced attempts to 
understand socio-economic and political change in Third World countries. 
In regard specifically to political change, a common view of "modern 
politics" which has been the subject of major debate is that it is 
characterized by the organization of political institutions such as parties , 
public bureaucracy, parliament, elections, etc., as these have been known to 
2 operate in Western democracies. 
In the case of elections, these should be freely contested by 
candidates, put up by rival parties which present voters with different 
platforms. Through secret ballot, one candidate gets elected and becomes 
the representative in parliament for a fixed term. It is appropriate 
to concede that major developments, such as the emergence of one-party 
states, have resulted in changes of certain assumptions about elections, 
especially in African countries. All the same elections have been 
3 essentially viewed in the context of modern democratic politics. 
The broad objective of this analysis is therefore to examine the 
extent to which, after nearly a quarter century, the organization and 
practices in post-independence elections in Kenya, particulaly the 1979 and 
1983 General Elections in the case of Bondo and Gem constituencies in Siaya 
District, conform to the more widely accepted views of modern politics. 
And in view of our concerns, the role that the indigenous institutions and 
values play in the political process will be of special interest. Thus, the 
specific question being addressed is the extent to which ethnicity is a 
crucial determinant of behaviour and conflict in a conspicuous aspect of the 
1. Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: 
A critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15,2 
(1973): 199-226. 
2. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), pp.16-20; James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., 
eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). 
3. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, pp.18-19. Goran 
Hyden and Colin- Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: 
The Case of Kenya," British Journal of Political Science, 12,1(1972): 
22; Larry Diamond, "Class, Ethnicity and the Democratic State: Nigeria 
1950-1966," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 25,3(1983): 457-489. 
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political process namely, the electoral process. It is useful to add, 
regarding the choice of elections for this study, that in Kenya elections 
are also the key institution for a proper understanding of modern politics 
because of its relative persistence as compared to other political 
institutions notably political parties. 
Ethnic Approach to Political Analysis 
The overall perspective emanates from the basic premise, and hence 
the approach of this analysis, that it is by incorporating both "modern" 
and indigenous or so called "traditional" values into one's analysis, that 
political change and its various components in the election process, for 
example, can be more accurately understood. The point is not that there 
has been no concern about traditional values in analyzing political change 
in Africa. Rather, it has often been the case that in looking at the 
interaction process between traditional and modern values the latter has been 
given undue weight, resulting in assigning traditional values a residu al, 
and even negative role, but more importantly a transient role. 
The "national integration" school of analysis recognized what was 
5 
labelled tribal loyalties which later became known as ethnicity But it was 
seen mainly as a disintegrative influence in the newly independent African 
states. The expectation was that these divisive tendencies would disappear 
through a political modernization process resulting in the emergence of 
unified nation-states. The conclusion after observing the trend in these 
countries for only a few years was, however, that there was, instead, 
political decay. This was in reference to the dismal performance of the 
modern political parties and'the public bureaucracy which clouded the future 6 j 1 of modern elements in these political institutions. 
Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societie 
p. 213. 
5. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Fress ,19 76), p.15; Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena 
Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, (Berkeley and Los Angeles 
University of California Press, 19 76); Brian M. du Toit, ed., Ethnicity in 
Modern Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), pp.5-11. 
6. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1908); Joseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and 
Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
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Analyses using class approach have in the same vein argued that 
ethnicity is an indication of false consciousness. It is considered 
disruptive and slows down the process of class formation and the 
7 .crystallization of classes. 
The actual point of similarity with the national integration 
approach is that ethnicity, subsumed under what have been generally termed 
precapitalist relations, and more recently captured by the coinage "economy g 
of affection," is envisaged to give way to some other entirely new form 
of relations. In other words, both approaches visualize some kind of an 
assimilation process in which ethnicity vanishes. 
In direct contrast to the foregoing approaches, in this 
particular analysis there is a direct focus on ethnicity, not as a passing, 
but an enduring factor in the political process. Furthermore, it is 
maintained that in certain situations it plays an integrative role which 
needs to be emphasized also, as opposed to focusing mainly on disintegrative 
aspects as has been the case generally. Ethnicity, in other words, is 
not necessarily disruptive. 
In brief, the distinctive aspect of this analysis is that it is 
9 
asserting the continued existence of cultural pluralism in African states. 
And it is instructive to point out in this regard, that cultural pluralism 
has now gained public recognition in western capitalist states as well. So, 
experience has already shown that even in these industrialized states 
the assimilationist thesis is not being borne out by the facts after all. 
7. Archie Mafeje, "The Ideology of 'Tribalism,' " Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 9,2 (1971): 253-261; Larry D'iaomond, "Class, Ethnicity and the 
Democratic State- Nigeria 1950-1966," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 25, 3(1983): 457-489. 
8. Goran Hyden, No Shortcut to Progress: African Development Management in 
Perspective (Nairobi; Heinemann, 19 83), pp.8-22. 
9. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism; pp.3-22, Robert H. 
Bates, "Moderization, Ethnic Competiton, and the Rationality of Politics 
in Contemporary Africa?", in D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola, eds., State 
Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1983), pp.152-171. 
10. Milton J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977), p.371. 
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There is another important aspect of this analysis regarding the 
level of analysis. There is a shift here from interethnic to intra-
ethnic level of analysis which is rare particularly for political 
analysis in the African context.11 The rationale for moving further 
down the micro level, to below the ethnic group level, is to be able 
to identify forces operating at the subethnic group level. TheBe 
a r e the actual determinants of social action, by the ethnic group in 
some situations, and by only certain sections of it in others. The 
argument is that it is thus possible to avoid seeing an ethnic group 
as always being in solidarity and in struggles with other ethnic groups, 
as often appears to be the case when analysis is confined to the overall 
ethnic group . level 
political process at the 
Lastly, our analysis of the /intra ethnic level should shed 
some light on grassroots participation in development, especially the 
question of the role of traditional leadership. The point is that, if 
the traditional leaders are-in fact part and parcel of the rural populace, 
they cannot be simply ignored in any people-centered rural development 
12 
effort. 
Ethnicity in a Modernizing Political Context 
There have been, as pointed out at the outset, various analyses 
of tradition and modernity, their dynamics and interrelationships, in the. 
change process of the so-called African traditional societies. These 
analyses, in cases where there is appreciation of African traditional 
values , have been instructive in understanding ethnicity as a key fact»or 
explaining modern politics in the African context particularly in the post-13 independence period. It has been revealed first, that the view of these 
11 See Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism; Rene Lemarchand, 
"Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing 
Solidarities in Nation-Building," in Steffen W. Schmidt, et^al^ eds. , 
Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp.100-123. 
12. David C. Korten and Rudi Klauss, eds., People-Centred Development (West 
Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1984), Chapter 18; Coralie Bryant and Louise 
G. White, Managing Development in the Third World (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 19 82), Chapter 10. 
13. Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena; Rene Lemarchand, 
"Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa." 
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traditional societies as static is untenable. There was change and 
adaptation in these societies even prior to contact'with European 
societies. Furthermore , this pre-contact experience was not completely 
14 erased by European contact. 
Secondly, these,analyses have shown that the presumed similarity 
of traditonal societies is false. These societies have had multiplicity of 
tradition and have never been homogeneous in both a spatial and temporal 
sense. There were indeed differences between these societies to begin 
with which is what basically contributes to the specific character of each 
one of them in their development. Even following the colonial experience 
it is the persistence of a host of traditional forms in the post-colonial 
period that has proved a major stumbling-block for the emergence of single 
national societies. 
Thirdly, the conclusion has been reached that modernity and 
tradition are not mutually exl exclusive and that each does not constitute 
a closed, functionally interdependent system of attributes. In other words, 
the attributes of modernity and likewise of tradition,, do not 
necessarily appear as a "package." Rather, the attributes may be "unbundled" 
and absorbed selectively as evidenced in the actual dynamics of 
modernization in which mutual interpenetration and transformation has been 
the trend as opposed to the substitution of one set of attributes for 
another, i.e., of modernity for tradition. 
It is therefore more fitting, in analyzing the introduction of modern 
values, as in our case of elections, to talk of selective modernization, 
which may actually strengthen traditional institutions and values and uphold 
• . 15 rapid social change in certain spheres, but not in others. ~ Thus, we can 
ascertain the emergent patterns of behaviour and the attendant values, that 
may have evolved following the introduction of elections into an African 
traditional setting, and be able to identify the. relevance of ethnicity. 
14 Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study, of 
Societies," p. 212-213. 
15 . Ibid. 
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Ethnicity, for the purposes of our analysis, can be simply viewed 
as the social solidarity resulting from an ideology of unity based on actual 
or fictitious cultural, geographical or political characteristics. In an 
important sense, ethnicity is therefore a subjective phenomenon such that 
defining attributes of ethnic commonality such as language, territory, 
political unit, cultural values or symbols, etc., may have only a limited 
application in terms of ethnic group mobilization, in most modern political 
situations. An ethnic group, for instance, may not have a standardized 
16 language and all the members may not reside m one geographical location. 
But as a conceptual tool, ethnicity is, however, quite useful. 
It is, for instance, not burdened by the umption of monolithic social 
groups necessarily beholden to atavistic -customs such as tribe or 
tribalism. As a matter of fact, it happens that there are often conflicts 
within what are popularly regarded as tribes and that some, or all the 
groups, engaged in these struggles may also unite on the basis of ethnic 
.. . 17 criteria. 
Ethnicity, as a variable affecting political behaviour, can 
therefore be characterized as fluid, intermittent and experiential. In 
ethnically-based political action, individuals and groups may act on the 
basis of individual preference at one point in time, at another they make 
choices based on clan-based considerations; or might even decide to act 
in a given manner based upon their perception of class interests at stake. 
Ethnicity does not, therefore, inevitably lead to politicized "groups" like 
the American interest groups, pictured as coherent units, constantly 
involved in politics in order to »• rprotect and promote the interests of 
their members. As to the scope and intensity of political competition 
16. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, pp . 4-8-49. 
17. William R. Ochieng, "Tribalism and National Unity: The Kenya Case," in 
Albert Ojuka and W. R. Ochieng, eds., Politics and Leadership in Africa, 
(Nairobi: E. A. Literature Bureau, 1975), pp. 256-258. 
18. Gabriel A. Almond,,sA Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the 
Political Process," in Louis J. Cantori, ed., Comparative Political 
Systems (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1974), p.267. 
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centering around ethnicity, this is most often determined by how ethnic 
19 elites define political situations. 
At the level of the individual, for purposes of determining the 
scope of the individual's ethnic reference group in a political situation 
two important indicators would seem to be (i) the nature of stakes 
involved and (ii) the nature of the existing political climate. Ethnic 
allegiance and groupings are therefore dynamic in nature, making ethnic 
political mobilization responsive to certain kinds of situations and not 
to others, as underlined already in comparison to American interest groups. 
It would seem, therefore, that in African political situations, which for the 
most part are characterized by fluidity due to changing political climate that 
constantly alters stakes, ethnicity is a salient explanatory variable. 
However, to discover whether ethnic forces are operative in a 
particular African political situation is an empirical question. In this 
analysis of the organization and nature of elections as an institution, an 
attempt will therefore be made to identify those social forces that have 
been at play, whether organized around ethnic or other interests, with a 
view to specifying the role of ethnicity in a modernizing political 
context. 
Social Transformation in Gem and Bondo 
1. Pre-Colonial Period. 
In terms of ethnic context, Bondo and Gem constituencies are in 
Luoland. They are located in Siaya district which together with Kisumu 
and South Nyanza districts are the three "Luo" districts. Siaya was 
designated a district only in 1968, but it was part sud actually formed the 
central core of the old Central Nyanza district that has always been at the 
20 forefroit of Luo politics. 
19. Edmond J. Keller, "Revolution, Class and the National Question: The 
Case of Ethiopia," Paper prepared for National Conference of Black 
Political Scientists, 1980 Meeti»g, Atlanta, Georgia, March 6, 1980, 
p . M i l t o n J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict i» the Western World, 
p.374. ' 
20. Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 196 7), pp.25-29. 
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Economic history of the Luo reveals that as they -were forced to adopt 
a sedentary way of life, there was a greater reliance upon fishing and 
21 
agriculture for subsistence. This meant for Bondo people, engaging in 
fishing and livestock keeping, gaining relative importance over other 
agricultural enterprises. Gem people on their part took the lead in the 
establishment of sedentary cultivation, with greater dependence upon crops 
than cattle. In other words, Gem took to a sedentary way of life with 
a clear emphasis on crop farming, which resulted in land becoming 
increasingly crucial but scarce in their economy. In Bondo, in contrast, 
crop farming lagged .behind fishing and livestock keeping, and land remained 
in relative abundance. 
In regard to socio-political organization, the people of Gem 
(Jo-Gem), generally trace their lineage to a common ancestor Gem, 
believed to be their founder-father. But, there are amongst Gem 
people, two major lineage groupings known as Kojuodhi and Kwenda comprised 
of different clans. Also, in terms of settlement, Kojuodhi group of 
clans have generally settled in the north and the Kwenda clans to the 
south of Gem territory. In addition there are many ("jodak") settlers 
in the midst of Gem people but mostly found in the northern part of 
Gem territory. Among the settlers, people of Bantu origin comprised 
of a number of clans constitute a significant grouping, but there are 
22 also other "jodak" of Nilotic origin. 
It is believed that within Gem in cases of political groupings 
the Kwenda clans generally form an alliance and so do Kojuodhi clans, 
vis a vis one another, and are usually joined by the "jodak" living in 
their respective territories. However, a continual leadership struggle 
in Kwenda over the years kept clans to the south divided and 
facilitated their domination and rule to the great advantage of the 
northern clans. Kojuodhi, more as a result, historically dominated 
23 politics and leadership in Gem. 
21. M. Whisson, Change and Challenge, (Nairobi: Christian Council of Kenya, 
1964), p .43. , 
22. Samuel G. Ayany, Kar Chakruok Mar Luo, (Kisumu: Nyanza Printing Works 
Limited, 1951), p.31; Shadrack Male, Dhoudi Moko Mag Luo, (Kisumu: 
Olucch- Publishing House, 1950), pp.114-115. 
23. Shadrack Malo, Dhoudi Moko Mag Luo, p.116. 
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However, in fighting external forces in the precolonial period, 
Gem people buried their internal differences. And their wars, especially 
against their Bantu neighbors, worked towards greater Gem solidarity. 
This solidarity was promoted by a well established rulership (Chieftaincy) 
which produced strong rulers that in turn led Gem people in these wars. 
The situation in Bondo, in contrast, was onp of greater 
heterogeneity, internal strife and lack of solidarity. The first point 
to note is that Bondo is comprised of Sakwa, Asembo, Uyoma and Yimbo 
which are in effect separate entities to the same level as the whole 
of Gem. Secondly, there has not been an overriding unity principle 
between these entities apart from intermarriage. In the case of Asembo 
and Uyoma, their intermarriage developed into a geneological affinity 
24 
which may tend to be exclusive in relation to the rest of Bondo. 
Thirdly, Bondo peoples engaged in fierce internecine wars amongst 
themselves in which Sakwa seems to have been the main aggressor against 
Asembo, Uyoma and Yimbo, and in which there seemed to be a somewhat 25 consistent alliance between Asembo and ' Uyoma. 
Thus in Gem, in contrast to Bondo, socio-political organization 
revolved around one common ancestor, but there were strong well 
established alliances along clan lines into which "jodak," mainly of 
iar.tu origin, were also incorporated. It was the institution of chief-
taincy which was largely instrumental in the persistence of tradition in 
the form of danism. At the same time, the chieftaincy contributed 
towards maintaining Gem solidarity, especially in the face of a 
relatively high level of culture mix and change witnessed by Gem. In 
comparison to Bondo, the culture mix in Gem is also a pointer to the 
fact that, Gem seemed relatively well prepared for the oncoming external 
change during the colonial period, while Bondo in general terms exhibited 
persistence of tradition. 
24. M. Whisson, Change and Challenge, p. 25-26. 
25. Ibid. 
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2. Social Transformation Under Colonialism 
It needs to be reiterated that it is a key contention of this 
analysis that there was change taking place, albeit differently, in African 
societies before the imposition of colonial rule. Also that the outcome 
of this change had an effect on, and made contributions to subsequent 
stages of development thereby helping determine the nature of societies 
that evolved. Howerer, it must be admitted that, historically, it is 
colonialism, with its mission of drawing the African population out of 
subsistence into capitalist economy, that has had the greatest impact on 
social transformation in African areas such as Bondo and Gem. 
There were .focal points of action by colonizers, elements of 
which set a new, faster pace for change, • and at the same time 
constituted a force which thereafter engineered that change. These 
included first, setting up communications that went hand-in-hand with 
instituting colonial administration, which was euphemistically referred 
to as establishment of law and order. In reality, it was the imposition 
of a colonial state and laying the foundations for trade and exchange 
between African and capitalistic societies. 
Secondly, there was expropriation of land and/or imposition of 
limits on land use and settlement, coupled with measures designed to 
ensure African labour supply. These meant that directly Africans were 
deprived the use, for their own benefit, of the two major factors of 
production they possessed, i.e., land and labour. Even if not so deprived, 
indirectly, it meant that they would now be more easily exploited by their 
colonizers. 
Thirdly, certain services such as education, religion, health 
and the introduction of cash and food crops, which were considered 
crucial to the functioning of the colonial economy, were provided, albeit 
sparingly. These were actually the main vehicles for inculcating capitali-
stic norms. 
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In the case of Bondo and Gem, the beginning of colonial rule 
can be dated as coinciding with the arrival of European personnel in the 
region, in particular C. S. Hobley (Bwana Obilo) in 1896. An important 
distinction, however, is that the contact with Europeans and administrative 
26 
operations started first in Gem and later reached Bondo. It is also 
significant that Gem chiefs actually facilitated the process of imposition 
of colonial rule, especially the subjugation of parts of Bondo, notably 27 
Uyoma, where there was open resistance. Thus in Gem, the encounter points 
to a mutual interaction, and hence faster formalization of colonial 
administration, than in the case of Bondo. 
The mark of British colonial administration being imposed on 
Luoland, and beginning to affect the daily lives of the local people, was 
when the boundaries which had been fluctuating between subtribes, e.g. 
Gem, Sakwa, Uyoma, etc., from month to month were frozen. A new name 
"location" was given to the territorial units inhabited by the subtribes 
which were known to them as "pinje" and of which there were 12 in 
Central Nyanza, viz Gem, Sakwa, Asembo, Uyoma, Yimbo, Alego, Ugenya, Seme, 
Kisumu, Kajulu, Kano, and Nyakach. It should, however, be emphasized that 
the boundaries of each subtribe had all along been clearly defined, 
despite continuous sporadic fighting because of earlier hostilities over 
a fairly wide stretch of land left for hunting which also acted as a buffer 
28 zone between one subtribe and another. 
In each location the colonial administrators sought to find 
chiefs who in their view commanded the respect of the people. The chiefs 
in turn, with the approval of the administration, appointed a member of 
the dominant clan ip sub areas of the location as Headman for his "Gweng 
his land. At a lower level within 
mar Dhoot," ie., / clan areas sub-Headmen were appointed also, following 
lineage principle. Granted there were cases of irregularities, e.g., 
26. Patrick 0. Alila, "Kenya General Elections in Bondo and Gem: The Origins 
of Luo Ethnic Factor in Modern Politics," Working Paper No.403, 
(Nairobi: IDS, University of Nairobi, Ju»e 1984): 16-17. 
27. Samuel G. Ayany, Kar Chakruok Mar Luo, p.26; Shadrack Malo, Dhoudi: 
Moko Mag Luo, p.16. 
28. Bethwell A. Ogot, A History of the Southern Luo, (Nairobi: E.A. Literature 
Bureau, 1967), p.185. 
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nepotism, but generally there was representation in local leadership which 
approximated the indigenous- system to a large extent. This proved 
instrumental in maintaing in political activities, the importance of the 
29 preexisting lineage structure guided by the hereditary principle. 
At any rate, in performing their duties the chiefs and their 
assistants were the agents of the colonizers. Through them, various 
measures were introduced that resulted in a system essentially of tribute 
paid to Europeans in exchange for security in their positions and military 
support in time of crisis. The most celebrated of those measures were 
taxation and labour conscription. The judiciary function was also an 
important part of the work.of chiefs and their "Jodong Gweng" (Elders). 
Those chiefs who cooperated with the new power were used against those who 
did not. This had direct implications fcr the entrenchment of colonial 
administration in that it varied from area to area depending mainly on- the 
extent of mutual cooperation with the local indigenous leadership and the 
latter®s own local ambitions. 
The cordial relationship Gem had during the initial contact with 
the Europeans thus thrived and resulted in a strong bond with the colonial 
administration. The point is that, as it greatly facilitated their work, 
the colonizers strengthened and maximized the linkages with Gem and similar 
areas where their basic requirements were being met and their ideas received 
with enthusiasm. Railway and road communication networks +vat gave rise to 
major trading centers were located in Gem leaving Bondo in the "rain 
shadow." This move had far reaching implications due to the fact that the 
introduction of additional socio-economic change occured along communication 
routes for ease of administration. The new cash crops such as maize, 
cotton, etc., were introdueed following this pattern to facilitate super-
vision and eventual transportation for marketing. Likewise, the setting 
up of schools, and to a lesser extent, churches, was influenced by the 
communication network. It is therefore significant that a branch railway 
line was constructed passing through Gem and a major road to Kenya-Uganda 
border also built. To this development is closely linked the popularization 
of the growing of maize in Gem; a' process which was no doubt aided by the 
29. G. M. Wilson, Luo Customary Law and Marriage Law Customs, (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1968), p.l. 
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fact that Gem people had already started putting emphasis on crop 
cultivation in their agricultural activities. The building of schools 
was also undertaken to the advantage of Gem. This is especially true 
with regard to two high schools, St. Mary's Yala and Maseno, which were 
30 for long the only high schools in the whole of Luoland. 
It was because bf the strategy of colonial administration of 
maximizing results of initially established linkages like Gem that 
colonialism had greater impact there than in Bondo. It is, however, 
important to note that even within Gem itself, it was the northern 
portion, which was laid bare for colonial maneuvers due to ease of access, 
that had a relatively greater impact than the southern portion. Thus, 
change in outlook and material well being brought about by education, 
labour migration, crops grown, health services, etc., have accentuated 
precolonial differences in social transformation between areas in 
significant ways that have a bearing on modern politics. 
A cursory look at the current socio-economic situation in Gem 
as compared to Bondo is actually quite revealing. The level of agricultural 
practices in Gem, including-cash cropping, keeping improved livestock, 
cooperative organization, marketing channels, etc., points to greater -
commercial orientation in cmtrast to subsistence orientation predominant 
in Bondo. As regards transportation and communication, Gem can boast >• 
of two major tarmac roads, supplemented by a number of feeder roads 
linking up virtually all corners of Gem and, of course, the historic 
railway line. Bondo has only one major tarmac road and most parts are 
still remote and inaccessible in.relative terms. Gem is better served 
by postal services and newspapers are locally available to a greater extent 
than in Bondo. Similarly, Gem is better served in terms of welfare 
services including water supply, education and health services. Lastly, 
the level of rural industrialization is higher in Gem than Bondo as 
evidenced by the presence of a white sugar factory, supplemented by three 
jaggery factories and widespread informal sector activities, e.g., flour 
mills, tailoring, tinsmith, bicycle repair, shoe repair, carpentry, making 
charcoal burners, etc. 
30. Patrick 0. Alila, "Kenya General Elections in Bondo and Gem," pp.19-21. 
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Emergence of Luo Ethnic Factor in Modern Politics 
It seems appropriate that a discussion of modern politics focusing 
on elections should, in the Kenyan context, start from mid-19 55 when the 
emergency ban on all African political organizations following the Mau-Mau 
31 
revilt was relaxed. It was then that the colonial government realized the 
futility of continued European political domination and set forth a framework 
for African political development. But, significantly, confined the 32 formation of political associations to a district basis. 
In essence this was the sane strategy employed in setting up 
colonial administration whereby district boundaries were drawn to 
coincide with tribal land limits.. At a lower level, as evidenced in 
Luoland particularly, sub-district units boundaries also coincided with 
subtribes. The intended effect of colonial intervention in this way even 
in this new phase of political evolution, was to play up local-level 
district or tribal loyalties. There was therefore the danger at the very 
onset of uneven pace of political development between districts , 
locations, etc., which would subsequently be the source of parochialism 
rooted in tribal loyalties at the expense of African national Unity. As 
a matter of fact, the colonial government refused registration of Kenya 
African National Congress proposed by Argwings-Kodhek, an African Luo 
33 
lawyer from Gem because the association aimed at becoming colony wide. 
And although the associations permitted by the colonial administration 
were a landmark in political development, they had the consequence of 
encouraging parochialism. 
31. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963-8, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp.15-18. 
32. Cherry Gertzel, et al., Government and Politics in Kenya, (Nairobi: 
E.A. Publishing House, 1969), p.106. 
33. Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, p.147; Also David Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: 
The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1982), p.77. 
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At the same time, new leadership opportunities opened up 
prospects for alliances as it turned out to be the case for Bondo and 
Gem leadership despite their differences especially during colonization. 
Argwings-Kodhek's Congress was based in Nairobi while the rural district 
association in Central Nyanza was controlled by Oginga Odinga coming from 
Bondo. This resulted in the two prominent Luo leaders from Central Nyanza 
having different areas of operation, thereby limiting conflict. For 
Cfiinga who had gained ascendancy in Luo politics within Luo Union (EA) 
culminating in his election to the Legislative Council in 1957, assuming 
the leadership of the new form of political organization in Luoland gave him 
a dominant position in Luo leadership, while enhancing the position of Bondo 
34 
in Luo politics, as compared to Gem. But it was only on the surface 
that political parties as elements of modernity seemed to be triumphant over 
ethnicity, but even then only temporarily. This happened because 
it was a time when ethnic considerations became secondary to matters 35 
of national unity and independence. Once independence was attained ethnicity 
emerged as a major factor in modern politics. 
34. Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, p.28. 
35. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya, p.11; Crawford Young, 
The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, p.133. 
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Manifestations of Luo Ethnic Factor in Parliamentary 
Elections: Bondo and Gem By-elections. 
The evidence of Luo ethnic factor playing a role in modern 
politics started surfacing in the initial by-elections in Bondo and 
Gem following independence. Although the Bondo by-election was in 
1966 and the Gem by-election in 1969, they both had a lot in common 
showing that they were part of a wider social transformation process, 
which helps explain the nature and outcome of these and later elections. 
The different timing of the by-elections in Bondo and Gem can be attribu-
ted to the contrast peculiar to the two constituencies. Apart from 
differences in social transformation, leadership visions of Odinga and 
Argwings-Kodhek, who became members of Parliament (MPs), representing 
Bondo and Gem respectively following the 1963 General Elections, 
added to the contrasts of the two constituencies. 
The Bondo by-election was held as part of Kenya's Little 
General Election in 1966 because of Odinga quiting the government and 
KANU and forming an opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU)^ 
Gem by-election was held as a result of untimely tragic death of 
Argwing-Kodhek, on the road at night, within Nairobi, in January 1969.. 
However, in view of the fact that they were both prominent, nationally 
renowned Luo leaders; in both by-elections the question of overall Luo 
leadership was of primary concern within the community. There was a 
growing feeling that thex^ e we're forces at work to deprive the Luo 
of nationalist leaders who had brought them to the center of power 
with the attainment of independence. This therefore marks the 
beginning perceptions of external threats. 
Furthermore, Odinga and Argwings-Kodhek had made sacrifices 
and compromises which resulted in Kikuyu leadership gaining control 
of the new African government. To get rid of them was therefore viewed 
as a sign of ingratitude to them and the community as well. In other 
words, the Luo community felt they were being denied a "fair" share 
of the fruits of independence brought about by their participation 
in the winning coalition with the Kikuyu. There was, at the same 
time, a feeling of resentment about the fact that national leaders 
3 6 Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya, pp. 73-78. 
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who had held opposing views about the timing of independence and the 
release of Jomo Kenyatta, for instance, and their communities, were 
gaining ascendancy in the national power structure at the expense of 
the Luo. The resultant common feeling of being outcasts only served 
to strengthen the bonds of Luo unity. 
The popular feeling and ethnic solidarity within the Luo 
community is reflected in the over-whelming support given to KPU 
candidates in the two by-elections. They registered landslide vic-
tories over KANU candidates despite government backing for the latter 
37 
and restrictions on the KPU candidates. As a matter of fact, KANU 
had problems finding candidates and the final selection was done on 
the basis of local internal constituency politics. • In Bondo, the 
KANU candidate had had longstanding and somewhat personal differences 
with Odinga which is what really prompted him to run against Odinga. 
It is interesting to note that the KANU candidate viewed his location 
of origin, Uyoma, as his ethnic reference group. In Gem, clan politics, 
especially in North Gem, was crucial in determining who was to be the 
KANU candidate to run against the KPU candidate. A well known Odinga 
supporter and a straightforward choice of his party, the KPU candidate 
rose above the traditional clan politics within Gem in being designated 
a party candidate. These are useful pointers to the fact that scope 
competition . . and intensity of political/ centering around ethnicity is 
determined by how ethnic elites define political situations KANU in 
particular was caught up in intra ethnic competion while KPU rose 
above it in both constituencies. This is mainly because KANU leader-
ship in view of difficulties of maintaining support in Luoland was 
mobilising support at the sub-ethnic level while the KPU, due to its 
grassroots popularity in Luoland, pitched its campaigns at the level 
of overall Luo ethnic solidarity. 
The organization structure for both by-elections was 
virtually the same in terms of heavy reliance on Luo clan relations 
in Bondo and Gem. This was augmented by the use of Luo idiom and 
44 
John Okumu, "The By-election in Gem: An Assessment," East Africa 
Journal 6, 6, June 1969; Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent 
p . 80 
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symbolism, which was much more intense in the Gem campaign. In part, 
this is due to the fact that it is in Gem where there was a real 
contest as compared to Bondo where the outcome of the election was a 
forgone conclusion. Also the circumstances of Argwings-Kodhek1s death 
were such that foul play was suspected. 
The issues were also practically the same. The emphasis was 
on government rural development effort which the KPU argued showed 
neglect in matters such as education, health services, and agricultural 
credit. The stand of KANU candidates was that all the same the 
government was powerful and would bring about progress. This was, 
however, difficult to demonstrate in an improverished rural constituency. 
But the hot issue remained the resulting effects of Kikuyu domination ' 
38 of the civil service and trade, and specifically Odinga5s position. 
The campaign strategy Odinga employed in view of government 
restrictions on him regarding public meetings, was informal conversa-
tional style meetings. As it turned out, the restrictions made him 
even more popular. It is worth mentioning specifically his regular 
appearances at funerals which for the Luos are traditionally sacred 
and emotionally charged and therefore resulted in his endearment to 
the community. It was actually said of Odinga that he "had become a 
major social force in Luoland such that without major social and economic 
39 
changes in Luo society it will be extremely difficult to dislodge him" 
But, instead of social and economic changes the ensuing trend of 
events only served, to mobilize the Luo behind Odinga. 
A historic, and the most important event was the assassination 
of Tom Mboya, a Luo nationalist of the same stature as Odinga, and 
Argwings-Kodhek, This took place hardly six months after the death 
40 
of Argwings-Kodhek which was therefore still fresh in peoples' minds. 
As these two were the prominent Luo ministers who remained behind, 
after Odinga and his KPU colleagues such as Oneko quit the government 
the assassination added a new dimension. The prevailing view was 
38 Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya, p. 118 
39 John Okumu, "The By-Election in Gem," p. 17. 
40 -Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, pp. B 122-26. 
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now that there was a calculated move to completely exclude Luos from 
the government and it brought Luo solidarity to the highest peak ever 
in the post independence period. 
It was in an attempt to break up Luo solidarity and stave 
off an onslaught on the Kikuyu hold on power that Kenyatta went to 
Luoland as a demonstration of strength and show of being in control. 
The inevitable outcome was a bloody confrontation with Odinga and his 
supporters. But for Kenyatta, this served as a good excuse for Odinga 
and other KPU leaders and MPs to be arrested and thrown into detention. 
To crown it all KPU was banned and Kenya once again became a de facto 
- * 41 one-party state. 
' The| Aftermath of KPU Era:Luo Political Leadership -and Participation 
Crisis 
In the Luo political context the period following the banning 
of the KPU up to the 1979 General Elections can be characterized as 
one of crisis of participation and leadership. The KPU having become 
the popular party in Luoland was the vehicle for participation in 
modern politics. Therefore, banning KPU automatically resulted in 
a crisis of participation. The leadership crisis was brought about 
by the detention of Oainga and other KPU leaders, and subsequently by 
banning Odinga from contesting parliamentary elections following 
his release from detention. 
The crux of the problem was that all along, popular political 
party leadership in Luoland, and hence leadership in national politics, 
had remained essentially identical with Luo community leadership. 
Therefore, by merely ostracizing these leaders it could not be expected 
that their following and organization machinery would easily come 
under the control of a new leadership, especially the rival minority 
41 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black_ Africa, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press,"1982), pp. 103-105; C. "Young 
The_PoliticS of Cultural Pluralism, pp. 133-134. 
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leadership in Luoland that had remained in KANU. The latter had proved 
unpopular with the people as clearly demonstrated by the crushing defeat 
of KANU in the by-elections. In addition there was a strong belief 
in Luoland that the rival group was responsible for the political 
banishment of the KPU and its leadership due to the formers ambition 
to capture Luo leadership. 
At the grassroots level, since the KPU machinery was based 
on Luo community organization, an important consequence of the crisis 
for political organization was the rejuvenation of Luo traditional 
political organization. This meant that, in effect, small interest 
groups mostly at the clan level reemerged as the crucial political 
42 
grouping guiding political action. This situation, it shoud be noted, 
is basically similar to the state of political organization prior to 
the formation of KANU and KPU when there were no popularly accepted 
unifying links above the clan level. But such links had become essential 
in a modern political context. It is in this sense that one can under-
stand the fact that, from 1969 up to the present, Luo community leadership 
has been a central question in parliamentary elections because of the 
dual role of parliamentary representatives which includes community 
leadership as well. 
In response to the Luo ethnic demands for unity and progress 
an attempt was therefore made by the newly elected MPs in 1969 to 
forge one common leadership. At this stage no attempt was made to 
exclude Oding and his detained colleagues. But soon after the release 
of Odinga from detention, and especially as 1974 elections approached, 
a division emerged and widened thereafter such that by the time of 
the 1979 elections one could definitely talk of two opposing camps 
in Luo leadership. On the one hand those for, and, on the other hand, 
those against, Luo leadership headed by Odinga. 
The widening of the rift in Luo leadership can be mainly 
attributed to actions by the Executive, especially after 1974 elections. 
These actions, it was obvious, blatantly favoured individuals well 
42 Goran Hyden and C. Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party 
Systems," p. 22 
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known to be in the anti-Odinga camp. At the same time they were 
apparently meant to spite those considered by the establishment to be 
in the Odinga camp. 
In Bondo, Omamo, after winning that parliamentary seat in 
the 1969 election in the absence of Cdinga, was appointed a cabinet 
minister in an apparent move to replace Odinga in Bondo and subsequently 
Luo politics. This became obvious when Odinga was barred from 
contesting the 1974 election and he counteracted the move by supporting 
the candidacy of Ougo Ochieng' against Omamo. Although Ougo won the 
election, apart from not being appointed a minister, he had to sit in 
parliament with Omamo who was appointed a nominated MP after losing. 
It thus seemed that it was Omamo, who lost, who was rewarded. 
The Executive was also instrumental in maneuvers by opponents 
of Odinga to banish him from the party both locally and at the national 
level. It is in this context that the accession of Omolo Okero from 
Gem to the position of KANU national chairman can be understood. He 
was a cabinet minister and had been in that position and in national 
politics only since 1969 after the banning of KPU. But he was viewed 
as heading the anti-Odinga camp. He, for instance, led the group in 
what was termed the fight against the challenge posed by Odinga through 
43 
the Luo Union "to end the Odinga myth once and for all". • The 
leadership of the Union was soon after actually replaced by the anti-
Odinga group which installed a caretaker committee headed by Omamo. 
To say the least the trend of events relating to the Luo Union came 
as a shock to the Luo community earning the anti-Odinga group 
image of dissidents who had actually lost grassroots popularity and 
whom an increasing majority wanted to see removed from Luo parliamentary 
leadership. 
The problem of leadership in Luoland subsequently became 
quite critical until the end of the Kenyatta era. The beginning of 
the new Moi era was therefore seen by the Luo community as a chance 
to install a popular leadership and come back to the political 
The_Weekly Review, 26 May 1978 
- 22 - IDS DP 282 
mainstream. There was, in fact, great hope initially. But, this gave 
way immediately to grave doubts when the KPU issue which had become 
a stigma for the Luo community was revived to ban Odinga from contesting 
party and parliamentary elections. It can therefore be said that the 
1979 elections through which the new regime was seeking its own 
mandate to rule the country had around it an air of misgivings in Luo-
land regarding the future of the Luo ethnic group. 
Luo_Ethnic'Factory in 1979 and 1983 Elections 
1. 1979 General Elections in Bondo and Gem 
In Bondo and Gem, as for the rest of Kenya, the 1979 General 
Elections were particularly significant because of ushering in a new 
political regime. A major consideration was, therefore, in view of 
the prevailing intra-ethnic leadership rivalry, to elect a leadership 
that would work towards Luo unity and serve other political aspirations 
of the Luo community. Specifically, to bring to an end the isolation 
of Luos in Kenya politics. The fact that these needs fell in the 
realm of modern politics, it is interesting to point out, did not mean 
that they were found incompatible with Luo ethmic political organiza-
tion. The indication from looking at the candidates, campaign organiza-
tion and issues is in fact that Luo ethnic norms were dominant 
especially since the only political party, KANU, lacked local level 
grassroots organization in Luoland. This, however, also implies certain 
differences between Bondo and Gem elections because of local level 
heterogeneity in Luoland discussed earlier. 
Regaining candidates, Gem had many more candidates, than 
ever before in the history of the constituency, contesting this 
particular election. There were twice the number of candidates in 
Bondo which had only three candidates. The explanation of several 
candidates contesting the election in Gem seems to be leadership 
ambitions based on clan and even subclan rivalry, especially since 
only two candidates were well known politically even within Gem. 
The candidates fall into two distinct groups. First, those coming 
from the north, where there is intense rivalry, and therefore the 
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area that produced most of the candidates. Secondly, those coming 
from the south, where there are only two major rival clans which 
produced one candidate each. 
In Bondo there were strictly speaking two main contenders, 
the same as in the 1974 election. This is mainly a consequence of 
the dominant position of Odinga in politics, not only in Bondo, but 
the whole of Luoland, which neutralized the leadership ambitions of 
nearly all potential contenders. Odinga also made an astute political 
move by supporting a candidate who comes from a different location, 
Asembo, in view of the fact that, Omamo, the formidable opponent, comes 
from Odinga's own location, Sakwa. All the same, one could still see 
the aggressiveness of Sakwa within Bondo dating back to the pre-colonial 
days. The point is that in the final analysis the confrontation was 
really between Odinga and Omamo, both coming from Sakwa. 
• • 1 
The organization of election campaigns by the various candidates 
was similar in certain respects in both Bondo and Gem. The size and 
strength, however, differed from candidate to candidate principally 
on the basis of the scope of kinship ties, and effectiveness within 
kin groups of a candidate's key supporters. In most cases these were 
local elders and/or notables. The range of kinship ties included 
paternal kin, maternal kin, in-laws, etc., who could be scattered all 
over the constituency depending on the size of one's clan plus marriage 
and settlement pattern. The kinship network situation in Gem, because 
of clear-cut paternal kinship ties in the south as opposed to the 
north, is fairly straightforward. Conversely, in Bondo absence of large 
paternal kinship ties coupled with scattered maternal kin and in-
laws make the kinship network relatively complex. In any case, in both 
Bondo and Gem the strength of a candidate depended on kinship ties. 
There was also a difference between candidates in both Bondo 
and Gem depending on their financial resources. The finances were 
used mainly to furnish supporters with gifts in kind or cash, either 
44 Patrick 0. Alila, "Luo Ethnic Factor in the 1979 and 198 3 Elections 
Bondo and Gem," Working Paper No. 408, (Nairobi: IDS, University 
of Nairobi, June 1984); 5-18. 
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for their own use or to distribute to the electorate. Also, the finances 
were used to hire transportation to ferry youthful supporters to the 
campaign rallies in various parts of the constituency and it was obvious 
certain candidates had a lot more funds. All the same, the organization 
of active supporters to utilize the funds to effectively reach the 
electorate depended very much on the particular candidate's kinship 
network of support. The active supporters would be mostly close kin 
and they would have to work through trusted kin group or village rep-
resentatives to have an impact. 
It should be noted regarding public rallies, that it can 
happen that because a candidate has much money he can afford to 
transport his active sipporters, composed mostly of his close kin, 
to different rallies. This will give the superficial impression of 
widespread popular support which, if not supplemented with support 
from other kin groups cannot win an election. What it normally does 
is, that it raises the expectation of gifts on the part of the electorate. 
A notable difference between Bondo and Gem was that in Bondo 
all the candidates held joint rallies while in Gem, five candidates 
(5-group) held joint rallies and the remaining two candidates, Okero 
and Otieno Ambala, each held his own separate rallies. The 5-group 
rallies in Gem were similar to Bondo rallies in that they were chaired 
by an official from the provincial administration and only the candidates 
spoke for a specified number of minutes like in a debate situation. 
A significant difference-in the Gem 5-group rallies, however, is that 
the candidates were relatively political unknowns even within Gem. 
Also the group referred to themselves as 11 Jo-Gem Asili" meaning the 
true sons of Gem. This was particularly in reference to Ambala whom 
they described as coming from Alego ("Ja-Alego") by descent and there-
fore authentically not from Gem. 
Apart from Ambala and Okero campaign rallies being held 
separately, these rallies had certain distinctive features. They, 
to begin with, were not chaired by officials of the provincial 
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administration. Ambala invited those addressing his meetings to speak 
while Okero designated a well known university professor of history, 
Prof. B.A. Ogot, to be the chairman of his meetings. Secondly, the 
fact that not just the candidates were addressing these latter rallies 
was an important feature. These other speakers included retired civil 
servants, especially chiefs, local elders, local politicians, local 
women and church leaders, etc. , all of whom were influential persona-
lities in the whole of Gem or even just the southern or northern parts 
of the constituency. They could, all the same publicly, bring their 
influence to bear on the campaign. It is important to mention specifically 
among the personalities in Ambala's rallies, Wasonga Sijeyo, who was 
the former KPU member of parliament, who won the 1969 Gem by-election 
and had remained in detention until Moi came to power and released 
political detainees a few months before the 1979 elections. 
The issues in this campaign can be broadly categorized as 
leadership and personality traits on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, development matters. Leadership and personality were mainly of 
concern in relation to Luo ethnic leadership and national political 
status. However, there was also local level competition for leadership 
which was much more intense in Gem than in Bondo. It was also in Gem 
where the issue of development was a matter of intense debate. This 
was as a result of the feeling within Gem that the area was lagging 
behind in development, especially, after the death of Argwings-Kodhek, 
which was in contrast to the historically leading position of Gem in 
Luoland. 
In Gem it was the leadership capability of Okero wnicn was 
greatly in question resulting in a rallying call for his replacement 
as Gem MP. He had served for two terms, having gone to parliament 
in 1969 following the ban of KPU and detention of its leaders. A lot 
had been expected of Okero's leadership in Gem and Luoland generally, 
because of accession to the highest level of national political 
leadership as senior cabinet minister and the national KANU chairman, 
not to forget that he had been chosen a leader of Luo MPs during that 
period. In Gem specifically he was in addition seen, because of similar 
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traits such as being a lawyer and coming from Kojuodhi, as the person 
who would fit into the shoes of Argwings-Kodhek in leading Gem in 
modern politics. 
The key argument in the opposition to Okero's leadership 
was that he was not development conscious which summarized the feeling 
of the expectations not being fulfilled especially in Gem. It was 
lamented that Gem was no longer in a leading position particularly in 
self-help "harambee" development to build schools, hospitals, roads, 
etc., despite having a senior cabinet minister as the area MP for ten 
years. It is significant to point out also that, while there were 
complaints about the inadequate passive role of Okero in development 
even in the northern part of Gem where he comes from, in the south there 
was a feeling of complete neglect. 
However, the source of outrage against Okero was the style 
and quality of his leadership. There were widespread complaints over 
his failure to project the historical image of Gem and charges of 
inaccessibility. In addition there were accusations of dividing not 
only Gem people but also the Luo community. The people of South Gem 
strongly felt that Okero looked down upon them while he was also 
playing a leading role in the public campaign against Odinga's leader-
ship in Luoland. Thus, his approach to leadership pointed towards 
division not unity, in Gem or Luoland. This was the origin of a 
convergence of negative opinion of Okero among his opponents within 
Gem and elsewhere in Luoland. 
But the signs of imminent replacement of Okero then gave 
rise to traditional interclan rivalries within Gem that during the 
campaign showed there would be a division of the votes. This could 
even work to his advantage. The main rivalry was of course between 
Kojuodhi and Kwenda. Kojuodhi produced more candidates as already 
mentioned. But, apart from Okero, none of them was really politically 
known such that despite the danger of Kojuodhi votes being split he 
remained the most formidable Kojuodhi candidate. It is in the case 
of Kwenda where there were two strong candidates, within Kwenda at 
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least, that there seemed to be a balanced competition. The significant 
qualities of the two Kwenda candidates were that Otieno Arnbala, on the 
one hand, was politically well known in Gem but had the problem of 
being considered Ja-Alego. Ongili Owiti on the other hand, while 
relatively much less known politically in Gem, was regarded as being 
Ja-Gem Asili - a true son of Gem. In brief, danism became an issue 
more than ever before in election politics in Gem. 
In Bondo, in comparison, there was no conplex link between 
leadership, danism and development issues. There was mention of 
development matters such as domestic water, health facilities, roads, 
etc., but these were only secondary considerations. The overriding 
issue remained the position of Odinga in Bondo politics and his political 
leadership role in Luoland. In the background there was also a concern 
over his position nationally in view of the change in political regime 
in the country. And the issue as in previous elections, was again 
posed in terms of Bondo people making a choice between Odinga and Omamo. 
It was therefore preference for Odinga or Omamo which was critical 
and determined crystallization of clans in Bondo into two major 
groupings. The crux of the matter was the political rehabilitation of 
Odinga who had played a positive role in leadership in Luoland as opposed 
to Omamo who was viewed, like Okero, as engaging in divisive anti-Odinga 
politics in collaboration with forces from outside the Luo community. 
The outcome of the 1979 General Elections reveals that 
differences in social transformation in Bondo and Gem notwithstanding 
Luo ethnic factor was apparently the crucial element; underlining the 
versatility of ethnicity in modern politics. Omamo and Okero both 
suffered crushing defeat in Bondo and Gem respectively and yet they 
were extremely different as election candidates in two major ways. 
In contrast to Okero who was regarded as not being development conscious 
and considered inaccessible because of his leadership style, Omamo 
was generally viewed in Bondo as having played an active role in 
development and was not being accused of inaccessability. The common 
problem in their candidacies which resulted in their defeat is, there-
fore , the organization of an anti Odinga leadership in collaboration 
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with external forces, contrary to Luo ethnic political stand and 
aspirations. In the circumstances not even their national political 
status as former cabinet ministers could help them in an election , 
leave alone their strong persuasive individual personalities evident 
in the public rallies. 
There were, however, other significant contributing factors 
at the constituency level leading to these results. In Gem, with 
pervasive clan politics, it was crucial that the strong candidacy of 
Ambala attracted support from both Kojuodhi and Kwenda clans and a 
winning coalition emerged despite arguments about his descent from 
Alego. In this connection one needs to recognize the important role 
played by influential Gem local leaders who were able to bridge the 
gap between the two rival groups of clans and at the sane time give 
credibility to Ambala's origins. These leaders argued, regarding 
Ambala, that Luo culture, and especially in Gem where settlers C'jodak") 
were numerous, allowed for integration of "jodak" and their complete 
assimilation over time. The point, in brief, is the acceptance of 
Ambala's candidacy and the emergence of an alliance of different 
clans in support of Ambala. This was definitely more significant than 
the fact that Ambala was wealthy and a son-in-law of Odinga. 
In Bondo, just as in 1974, Ougo was using the political 
campaign network of Odinga which spread throughout Bondo. Ougo and 
his supporters led by Odinga therefore concentrated on a quiet 
village-to-village campaign. Omamo lacked such a network and this 
can be said to have been his major undoing. In the circumstances he 
concentrated on public rallies meanwhile sending his agents to dish 
out money to the electorate. As a matter of fact Bondo campaign 
rallies always had a large group of youthful Omamo supporters mostly 
from his Kapiyo clan. The conclusion points to the fact that in 
Bondo wealth and the showing in public rallies did not constitute a 
strong enough force to counter grassroots clan support for Odinga 
controlled by elders, in order to enable Omamo to win the election 
against Ougo. 
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2. 198 3 General Elections in Bondo ana Gem 
In terms of analysis the 198 3 elections in both Gem and 
1+5 
Bondo was a continuation of the trend observed in the 1979 elections. 
There were major similarities making 1983 look like a replay. 
For example, the strong contenders remained the same, i.e., Otieno 
Ambala, Omolo Okero and Ongili Owiti in Gem, and in Bondo it was 
Odongo Omamo and Ougo Ochieng'. The social forces remained basically 
the same evidenced by the persistence of rivalry between Kojuodhi and 
Kwenda as the key factor while in Bondo Odingaism was still the 
critical force. Even the issues including leadership, personality, 
development, etc., were essentially the same. The discussion of 1979 
elections is therefore instructive in understanding 1983 elections 
and the arguments are basically the same, and need not be recited. 
However, there were certain significant happenings between the two 
elections worth mentioning as they uphold and strengthen our arguments. 
Also, they help explain certain differences particularly in the actual 
results of 1983 elections. 
In Gem, Ambala, following his election as Gem MP, secured 
a belated appointment as an Assistant Minister but ran into increasing 
problems. There were growing complaints within the constituency that 
he was favouring his own small locality in his harambee contributions. 
The broader implication of this was that he was only concerned about 
the welfare of his fellow jodak. He was also increasingly viewed 
as self-centered, aggressive and of violent character. He was there-
fore alienating his supporters, especially influential Gem leaders 
who had tipped the scale and enabled him to oust a true son of Gern. 
Among the electorate the feeling of alienation was particularly strong 
among the Kojuodhi in the north, and among rival Kwenda subclans in 
the south that had supported Owiti's candidacy. 
There were additional problems Ambala was experiencing 
which went beyond the confines of his Gem constituency. For instance, 
US Ibid., p. 47-52. 
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In brief, the indications from the network of support, 
which was essentially for Odinga, and the vigorous campaign, was that 
Ougo was going to win the election with a big majority if he could not 
register a landslide victory. To the contrary, the election results 
announced by the returning officer was that Omamo was the winner. This 
failure of Ougo to win in 1983 cannot therefore be explained in terms 
of the social forces in Bondo and the realities of Bondo politics. The 
truth, following our analysis, seems to be in Odinga's conclusion put 
figuratively, that Omamo went to parliament "through the window." 
1979and_1983 Electorate Survey_Findings 
In trying to enhance our understanding of the extent to which 
ethnicity remains a dominant factor in the electoral process primary 
data was collected during 1979 and 1983 General Elections. Interviews 
were conducted with the electorate in Gem and Bondo constituences. 
The idea was to try and establish a participation and leadership 
choice pattern by way of comparison of the two areas during the two 
elections. The key findings are in relation to institutions in the 
electoral process and leadership choice factors. 
A. Institutions 
The institutions operating in the electoral process are a 
significant consideration because they influence participation in 
elections. The findings on KANU, the political party which is the main 
modern electoral institution, were that it only became of significance 
to the electorate at the time of clearance of candidates for the 
elections. There was evidence that more than 75 percent of respondents 
in Bondo and Gem are members of KANU. But only about 20 percent had 
attended any party meeting specifically, during 1983, the year of an 
election. Also, the data collected clearly showed that the party has 
virtually no role at all to play in the electoral process by way of 
creating awareness and mass mobilization. For instance, the res-
pondents when asked about the sources of information on election, 
ranked KANU leaders and meetings as the least important. This is, 
in a descending order, after the mass media, friends and relatives, 
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•market places, barazas, funeral gatherings, church groups and school 
teachers. 
The significance of KANU in the clearance of election candidates 
can, in addition, be said to be in a negative sense because it was 
essentially manifested as an expression of fear that a popular candidate 
would be barred from running for election. The findings from Bondo 
in this regard are instructive. When asked to state the main problem 
with selection ofcandidates in their constituency, about 60 percent 
of the Bondo respondents said in 1983 that it is the barring of 
candidates or more bluntly that it was linked to the clearance of 
Odinga. Furthermore, views were expressed in Bondo on this matter 
and other important party issues indicating concern that they are 
decided in Nairobi by KANU headquarters. Also that the decision on this 
and other matters could be manipulated by influentials to serve their 
interests. In other words, grassroots membership is virtually cut off 
from the party decision process. 
The party also has no role in the election process at the 
grassroots level once the decision on election candidates has been 
made. From the day of nomination until polling day, election matters 
become the responsibility of the Provincial Administration. Thus, 
the administration which belongs to the executive arm of government is 
the modern institution that plays a dominant role in the electoral 
process and not the party. Even election rallies assume the nature 
of meetings of the administration locally known as barazas in which 
the party has no role. 
The consequence of a dearth of modern political institutions 
is that the electorate can only participate in the electoral process 
... 47 as-individuals or grouped, not on party, but some other principle. 
The common forms of grouping found in Gem and Bondo included village, 
clan, location, church, and self-help groups which were practically 
all based on kinship principle. Gem provides the most clear evidence • 
42 Milton J. Esman, ed. Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, p. 375 
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of this pattern. In 1983, over 90 percent of those interviewed 
in Gem felt that elections in their constituency are influenced by 
clanism/locationalism and more so by danism. In other words, there 
is a prevalence of groups organized around traditional norms such as 
location, clan or other kinship ties. 
The findings on opinion makers and effective campaigners 
also shows that traditional institutions play a dominant role in the 
electoral process as compared to modern political institutions. In 
response to a question to rank leading opinion makers in their consti-
tuency, those interviewed in both Gem and Bondo ranked Elders ("Jodong 
Gweng") highest. Likewise, when asked who are the most effective 
campaigners, they again ranked the Elders highest. Educated Elite and 
Youth Wingers are ranked below Elders as opinion makers and effective 
campaigners, indicating a combination of both traditional and- modern 
elements. But the dominant position of traditional elements is not 
in dispute. 
It is important to bear in mind that we are talking about aninformed 
electorate and should not be misled by the above findings on opinion 
makers and campaigners into thinking the electorate is still caught 
up in traditionalism. This is evidenced by the fact that the majority 
of those interviewed were registered voters and had participated in 
previous elections through voting. They all knew who their MP was and 
most were able to identify his stronghold of support and to recall 
issues in previous elections. In addition, they actively participated 
in harambee development through their contributions and knew which of 
their leaders played a leading role in development, even if they felt 
he should not become an MP and therefore denied him their vote. 
B. Factors in Leadership Choice 
The post mortem findings on the factors which contributed 
to the victory of the MP who won in 1979 confirmed the existence of 
the social forces we argued are in operation in Gem and Bondo electoral 
politics especially danism and Odingaism. What is even more intersting 
is that an understanding of these forces already identified, and how 
- 35 - IDS DP 282 
they operate, it is evident, can help in the prediction of elections 
in these two constituencies. An indication of this is the pattern 
revealed by the results obtained in trying to determine the winners 
of the 198 3 election before polling day. 
The specific questions asked were first, whether the respondent 
voted for the winner in the 1979 election. Secondly, if the respondent 
would, in the 1983 election, vote for the same person who had won the 
previous 1979 election. The third question was then direct, asking 
the respondent to name the possible winner and the runner-up. 
In Gem when asked to name the possible winner and the runner-
up the responses of those interviewed were as shown in Table 1. 
It was indeed a close race between Owiti and Ambala as the actual 
outcome revealed even after the recount during the petition filed by 
Ambala. At any rate, a useful pointer to the subsequent by-election 
Owiti won with a landslide is that over 60 percent thought by 1983 
that Owiti would be the runner-up. This shows how much stronger than 
in 1979 his candidacy was regarded following his quiet campaign, having 
the right clan connections, etc. In contrast, Ambala's popularity 
was on the wane by 198 3. While 50 percent of the Gem respondents . 
agreed they had voted for the winner in 1979 (Ambala), only some 
40 percent agreed they would vote for the same person in 1983. 
Table 1. Gem Candidates Winning Score 
Candidate ' Winner Runner-u£_ 5V Score 
Ongili Owiti 22 52 96 
Otieno Ambala 39 13 91 
Qmolo Qkero 22 . . 19 63 
ft 
The score is arrived at by weighting, giving a score of 
2 if a candidate is mentioned as a possible winner and a 
score of 1 if mentioned as a possible runner-up. 
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In Bondo when asked to name the possible winner and runner-up 
the responses of those interviewed were as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Bondo Candidates Winning Score 
it Candidate Winner Runner-up Score 
Ougo Ochieng' 59 20 138 
Odongo Omamo 15 .44 74 
• it Score arrived as in Table 1 
These findings conform to our analysis and the clear winning position 
of Ougo can be linked directly to Odinga's influence. The historic 
move he made of standing down for Odinga to try and recaptuue' Bondo's 
seat demonstrated tha.t he was not an opportunist or a self-seeking 
leader and contrasted him sharply with Omamo. As a matter of fact, 
Ougo had gained more popularity than in 1979 according to our findings. 
When asked if they had voted for the winner in 1979 (Ougo), 66 percent 
of the respondents agreed. And then to the question if they would 
vote for that same person in 1983, 80 percent of the respondents 
agreed they would. 
Conclusion 
The key inference is that there is an interplay of modern 
and traditional values and that both influence electoral politics. 
In Luoland, however, the evidence points to Luo ethnic factor based 
primarily on traditional norms, playing an increasingly critical role 
in parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the indications are that 
ethnicity in Luoland has become an enduring factor in the political 
process. This is mainly because of the hold that elements of 
tradition have established over institutions for popular political 
participation at the grassroots level. 
The nature of participation is however determined by the 
stakes involved and how these are manipulated by the local influential 
leaders. It is in this context that one can understand the outcome 
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of elections in places like Bondo and Gem for instance. In Bondo, 
Ougo, enjoying Odinga's support, was able to win despite Omamo's 
relatively impressive record in development effort. Ambala was also 
able to win in Gem despite the dominant factor of clanism/locationalism, 
but had to give way to Owiti, a true son of Gem, in the next election. 
The working of the social forces is also such that just being 
wealthy and dishing out money, especially to youth wingers, cannot 
enable one to win an election in places like Bondo and Gem. The 
voters openly resent the suggestion that they can be bought, while 
youth are not the leading opinion makers and some may not even be 
registered voters. In Bondo, Omamo's conspicious wealth and support 
from youth could not convert Ougo supporters who in reality were 
Odinga supporters. Likewise, in Gem, there was widespread talk 
regarding Ambala's wealth during the 1984 by-election but Owiti, all 
the same, registered a landslide victory. 
The source of increasing strength of these social forces can 
be said to be political isolation of the Luo community and relative 
economic deprivation of Luo areas. These have been translated into 
an external threat especially by the local political leaders. And 
it is such an external threat that usually leads to an increasingly 
strong feeling of ethnic solidarity in culturally different situations 
48 even xn western democracies. 
48 
Milton J. Esmani ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, p. 371; 
C. Gregory Knight and James L. Newman," ecfs~*i Contermporary Africa: 
Geography 'and Change, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1976), 
pp . 2 7 - 2 9 " " " 
